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1. Introduction
After the collapse of the communist regimes in 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe, the 
countries in the region opened up their economies to foreign trade and foreign direct 
investment (FDI), and introduced reforms to encourage domestic competition. Among other 
benefits, reforms that promote competition have been expected to lead to higher productivity. 
The bulk of theoretical and empirical research backs up this view, pointing for example to the 
disciplinant effect of competition and to benefits steaming from improved access to 
intermediate goods (Romer 1994). Yet, there are also theoretical arguments which suggest 
that in certain circumstances increased competition has a negative impact on productivity. For 
example, in industries characterized by increasing returns to scale, increased competition 
might force domestic firms to scale down production and hence to move to higher average 
costs. In addition, competition might decrease the expected gains from innovation, and thus 
the innovation level, in companies that are far away from the technology frontier as these 
companies expect to loose market share to more efficient entrants (Boone 2000 and Aghion et 
al 2005b). Also an increase in competition might exacerbate the managerial slack problem if 
managers are highly responsive to monetary incentives (Scharfstein 1988). The slack problem 
also worsens if owners’ benefits from a marginal increase in efficiency decrease with the 
number of competitors as could be the case in Cournot competition (Martin 1993). 
 
All these theoretical results seem to indicate that the actual impact of increased competition 
on firm productivity dynamics might be ambiguous and, furthermore, that it might be context 
dependent. Whether the context plays a role in determining the actual impact of increased 
competition on firm productivity is an empirical question. Results emerging from the 
empirical literature emphasize the role played by policies and institutional aspects (see 
Winters 2004 for a survey). Less studied is the contribution that the industrial context has to 
this impact. In particular, the fact that the initial firm efficiency level affects innovation and 
therefore the firm productivity in a context of increased competition (Boone 2000, and 
Aghion et al 2005b) has been addressed by few empirical studies (Bernard et al 2006, and 
Konings and Vandenbussche 2007). The studies that have addressed this issue focused on the 
impact of a specific reform – trade liberalization – on firm productivity and the role played by 
the firm efficiency level. However, especially in emerging economies, trade reforms that 
promote openness are typically accompanied by other reforms that promote competition in 
general. Therefore, to assess the overall impact on competition on firm productivity one has to 
consider both domestic and import competition. In addition, if other reforms are not taken into 
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account one might attribute too much of changes in productivity to foreign competition. 
 
This paper analyzes the impact of competition on firm productivity, with a special focus on 
the degree by which the initial firm efficiency affects the relation between increased 
competition, on the one hand, and firm productivity, on the other hand. The analysis is done 
using a panel data of Czech firms for the period 1993-2005. In the Czech Republic’s 
transition process, fast and comprehensive trade and FDI liberalization has been accompanied 
by other reforms that have spurred competition (e.g. the reform of the financial system, the 
introduction of bankruptcy laws). As already indicated, we depart from the empirical 
literature on emerging markets by taking into account both domestic and foreign competition.  
 
We find that trade liberalization has a positive impact on firm productivity. Yet, this effect 
weakens with the increase in the initial level of tariff protection. Our results also show that an 
increase in market concentration induces higher productivity in markets in which domestic 
competition is tough. The latter result is consistent with the theoretical literature that suggests 
that both innovation and managerial efficiency lead to an inverted U-shape relationship 
between productivity and competition.  
 
With respect to the role of the initial level of cost efficiency for the impact of competition on 
firm productivity, we find that the above results regarding the impact of competition, both 
domestic and foreign, are not present in companies that are far away from the technological 
frontier, where there is practically no effect of competition on firm productivity. Furthermore, 
we assessed the extent to which the absence of a control for domestic competition biases the 
estimated effect of trade liberalization on firm productivity. We find that the effect of trade 
liberalization on firm productivity is seriously understated if a control for domestic 
competition is absent. Moreover, the fact that the initial firm efficiency affects the impact of 
trade liberalization is not anymore fully confirmed in these regressions. Thus, our results 
indicate that to assess the extent to which trade liberalization affects firm productivity one 
needs to control for domestic competition and to take into account the initial firm efficiency 
levels. 
 
The paper proceeds in the following way. Section 2 reviews the theoretical research that links 
competition and firm productivity and the existent empirical work. Section 3 describes the 
data we use and the methodology on which we base our empirical analysis. Section 4 presents 
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the empirical results and the results of several robustness checks. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Competition and productivity. Theory and empirical results. 
That increased competition in general has an effect on firm performance is already well 
established in the theoretical literature, though the sign of this effect might be ambiguous.1  
 
One of the perceived benefits from increased competition stem from the effect competition 
has on managerial slack. In companies in which managers have more information than owners 
about productivity shocks and own effort, if monopoly rents exist, managers can capture part 
of them in the form of slack. Yet, faced with higher competition, managers have to increase 
their effort to fulfil targets specified by incentive schemes (Hart 1983, and Scharfstein 1988). 
In addition, since unobserved productivity shocks are likely to be correlated across firms, 
higher competition from more efficient companies increases owners’ opportunities to 
compare or to assess the actual performance of their companies, and thus to design sharper 
incentive schemes (Nalebuff and Stiglitz 1983, Hermalin 1992, Holmstrom 1982, Meyer and 
Vickers 1995, and Nickell 1994). However, designing incentive schemes that induce high 
performance might become too costly when competition is strong as the additional effort 
necessary to deliver a good rather than a bad performance increases with competition, hence 
increasing managers’ incentives to underreport their productivity. Therefore, the effect 
competition has on slack might be non-linear, of a U-shape (Scharfstein 1988, Hermalin’s 
1992, Meyer and Vickers’s 1997, among others). The fact that competition might have a U-
shape relation with managerial slack has been backed up by Schmidt (1997), who showed that 
competition not only raises the probability of liquidation, but also reduces profits. Therefore 
when competition becomes too intense, managerial effort might in fact decrease with further 
increase in competition. 
 
Another benefit from increased competition steams from its effect on innovation, as a 
monopolist tends to “rest on his laurels” (Arrow 1962) or might get trapped in bureaucratic 
structures (Schumpeter 1934). Yet, Schumpeter (1942) has noticed that most of the innovation 
is done in big firms that have the necessary resources to invest and are able to accrue the 
associated benefits due to their position in the market. Therefore, much as the impact of 
competition on effort, the effect of competition on innovation could have an inverted U-
                                                 
1 For instance, see Winters (2004) for the impact of openness on firm performance. Also see Djankov and 
Murrell (2002) for a survey of literature for transition economies. 
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shape.2  
 
There is also an emerging literature on the role played by the initial level of firm efficiency in 
defining the actual impact of competition on firm productivity (Aghion et al 2005b, and 
Boone 2000). Thus, the threat of entry encourages incumbent advanced firms to invest in 
innovation in order to retain their market but discourages innovation in firms far from frontier 
as those companies expect, under any circumstances, to loose markets to more efficient 
entrants (Aghion et al 2005b, and Boone 2000). These results suggest that the relationship 
between competition and innovation (thus, firm productivity) is influenced by the initial firm 
productivity.  
 
To sum-up, theoretical results indicate that the relation between competition and firm 
productivity might have an inverted U-shape (either due to the U-shape relationship between 
competition and managerial slack and/or due to the inverted U-relationship between 
competition and innovation). Furthermore, the above results suggest that this relationship 
might be different in firms that are close to the technology frontier than in backward firms. 
 
Turning to the empirical literature, several empirical results support the theoretical conjecture 
of a U-shape impact of competition on managerial slack (Green and Mayes 1991) and of an 
inverted U-shape relationship between innovation and competition (Scherer 1967, and Aghion 
et al 2005a). In addition, the empirical literature has often addressed these relations indirectly, 
by searching for a relation, usually linear, between competition and firm productivity. Thus 
Nickell et al (1992) and Nickell (1996) found that an increase in import competition had no 
impact on firm productivity in UK manufacturing. Yet, an increase in market share had a 
negative effect on the level of productivity, probably due to the negative effect that an 
increased in monopoly power has on managerial and workers’ effort. 
 
More generally, decreases in trade costs also spur competition, and to that account there are 
numerous papers that look at the effect of openness on productivity. Substantial evidences 
show that changes in openness lead to a reallocation of resources and market shares from 
inefficient to efficient firms, and therefore had a positive impact on the evolution of industry 
productivity (for a review see Tybout 2003). There are also evidences that trade cost 
                                                 
2 Aghion et al (2005a)’s theoretical model confirms this fact. 
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reductions enhance productivity at the plant level both in developing and developed countries 
(see Pavcnik’s 2002, Bessonova et al 2003, or Sabirianova et al 2005a for studies on 
emerging economies, and Lawrence 2000 and Bernard et al 2006b for studies on the US).  
 
Thus, apparently, empirical analyses that consider only one aspect of competition – trade cost 
reductions – yield different conclusions regarding the impact of trade liberalization on 
productivity than those papers that consider both foreign and domestic competition. As 
indicated by the theoretical results, this might be due to differences in the context in which 
trade liberalization has taken place (e.g. the initial level of firm efficiency in the industry) but 
could also be due to the fact that in the absence of a control for changes in domestic 
competition induced by other market reforms that typically (although not always) accompany 
trade reforms, the coefficient of trade liberalization picks up their effects. This is one aspect 
that we investigate in our empirical analysis. 
 
As the impact of competition on firm productivity seems to be contextual dependent, several 
studies have tried to unveil the underlying conditions that favour a positive relation between 
increased competition and firm productivity. Emerging results emphasize the role played by 
policies and institutional aspects (see Winters 2004 for a survey) or by industrial aspects. 
Among the studies that have focused on the latter factors, results show that a positive and a 
stronger relationship between competition and firm productivity is likely to exist in highly 
concentrated industries (MacDonald’s 1994), in low-skill intensive industries (Lawrence 
2000), or in non-multinational companies (Bernard et al 2006).  
 
Also, some empirical studies address the role the initial efficiency level plays in moderating 
the impact of competition on firm productivity, as suggested by the theoretical studies of 
Boone (2000) and Aghion et al (2005b). Aghion et al (2005b) show that entry liberalization 
lead to a rising inequality in the regulated manufacturing sector in India, and moreover, that 
productivity increased by more in industries that were close to the Indian productivity 
frontier. Sabirianova et al (2005) find that increased foreign presence in Czech and Russian 
industries lead to a rise in the efficiency of foreign firms, which are assumed to be at the 
outset closer to the technological frontier, but had a negative effect on productive efficiency 
of domestic firms, which are less efficient. Konings and Vandenbussche (2007) find that a 
decrease in competition due to antidumping protection helps more laggard EU companies 
than cost efficient ones. Topalova (2004)’s results, however, show that trade liberalization did 
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not lead to divergence in productivity within Indian industries as similar productivity 
improvements can be noticed in firms with both high and low productivity prior to the trade 
reform. As well, Bernard et al (2006) find no evidence that the impact of trade costs reduction 
on productivity was different for firms with different productivities in US manufacturing. 
Thus, there are few but mixed evidences of a differential impact of competition on firm 
productivity according to the initial efficiency level. 
 
The present study analyzes the impact of competition on firm productivity, and compares the 
response to competition of firms that are closer with those that are farther away from the 
technological frontier. Among the studies we have mentioned above, only three directly tackle 
the discrepancy in response to competition of firms with different initial efficiency: Bernard et 
al’s (2006), Topalova (2004), and Konings and Vandenbussche (2007). These papers, 
however, look only at the effect of trade cost reductions on firm productivity. Given the 
inferences we drawn from Nickell et al (1992) and Nickell’s (1996) results, unlike these 
studies, we look at the impact of both domestic and outside competition on firm productivity. 
This allows us to assess in this study the extent to which the absence of a control for domestic 
competition biases the effect of trade liberalization on firm productivity and the conjectures 
regarding the differing impact of trade liberalization on productivity with respect to the initial 
firm efficiency. 
 
3. The empirical methodology and data description 
3.1. Methodology  
We do our empirical analysis in two steps. First, we estimate firm productivity. Second, we 
study the impact of competition both on all firms and on sub-samples that have at the outset 
high/low productivity. 
 
3.1.1. Estimating firm productivity 
We assume a Cobb-Douglas production function 
itititlitkit lky υ+ω+β+β+β= 0  (1) 
where i is the firm index, t is the time index, y is log of output, k is log of capital, l is log of 
labour, and the residual term is decomposed into a time varying productivity shock, ω, that is 
not observed to the econometrician, and a white noise, υ. To estimate this production function 
we use the semiparametric approach developed by Olley and Pakes (1996) that allows us to 
obtain a time-varying measure of plant productivity that accounts for the simultaneity bias. If 
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firms that experience a positive shock known only to the firm choose to use more of the 
variable inputs, the OLS estimates of the production function will be biased upwards.3 4  
 
Estimators of (1) that take into account the simultaneity bias could be obtained in two steps. 
In a first step the investment, i, which is a function on the extant capital and firm productivity 
is inverted to express unobserved productivity, ω, as a function of observables: 
),( ititit kih=ω .5 This implicitly assumes that investment increases with productivity and that 
investment levels are strictly positive. Then the following equation is estimated 
( ititititkitlit kihkly ) υβββ ++++= ),(0  (2) 
to get consistent estimates of βl. Next, we consider the expectation at time t-1 
[ ] [ ]10 −++=− itititkititlit EkklyE ωωβββ  
which, given that productivity follows a first order Markov process (which is assumed in the 
OP procedure) leads to 
itititkititkitlit kkly υξβφθββ ++−+=− −− )( 11  (3) 
and thus to consistent estimates of the capital coefficient (ξ stands for unexpected productivity 
shocks). Equations (2) and (3) are estimated using polynomial expansions for h() and θ().  
 
Firm productivity is calculated as  
  (4) itkitlitit klypr ββ ˆˆ −−=
for each industry.6 We further define a productivity index as being the difference between a 
firm’s productivity and the average productivity in the industry (at 2-digit level) in the year 
2000, 
                                                 
3 In addition to the simultaneity bias, the OLS estimates of the above production function are likely to be plagued 
by a self-selection bias that is connected to firm entry and exit. With respect to exit, firms with more capital are 
likely to sustain higher adverse shocks without exiting. The Olley and Pakes (1996) procedure allows one to 
control for the self-selection bias associated with firm exit which induces a downward bias in the estimates of the 
capital coefficient. We cannot, however, control for this bias since in our sample there are too few firms that exit 
the market.  
4 Alternatively, we could use the GMM estimator developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). Yet GMM estimates 
produce small and insignificant capital elasticities and sharp decreasing returns to scale due to the fact that the 
series on sales, capital and employment are highly persistent so lagged levels are only weakly correlated with 
subsequent first differences (Blundell and Bond 2000 and our own estimations). 
5 See Good, Nadiri and Sickles (1996) for a discussion of the properties that various productivity indexes have 
(this one is transitive and insensitve to the units of measurement). 
6 Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) (LP) has further modified the OP procedure by using intermediate inputs instead 
of investment to control for unobservables. Yet, unlike OP, LP need to assume perfect competition in the output 
market in order for the intermediate input to be monotonic increasing in productivity, and thus, to be able to 
invert the productivity shocks. In addition, Ackerberg et al (2005) argue that LP procedure suffers from 
multicollinearity that affects the estimate of the labor coefficient. 
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 . Iitit prprpi −=
 
3.1.2. The effect of competition on firm productivity 
Having estimated the productivity of the firm, we can now assess the effect of competition on 
firm productivity, by estimating the following model 
itittititit indtimeccpi νααααα +++++= −− 43212110  (5) 
on the pooled data, where c is a vector of measures that aims to capture both domestic and 
foreign competition; time is a vector of year indicators that covers omitted macroeconomic 
events that affect all firms; indit is the industry affiliation (at 2-digit level) and controls for 
unobserved industry-specific factors influencing the level of firm productivity; and νit 
captures all other shocks to firm productivity. To avoid possible endogeneity problems and to 
account for the fact that firms’ adjustments to changes in competition may take time to 
materialize, we use lagged values of competition. We introduced a square term for 
competition to capture the fact that there might be a non-linear relationship between 
competition and firm productivity. As mentioned above, theoretical work has shown that there 
are at least two reasons why such a non-linear relationship might exist. First, between product 
market competition and innovation there is an inverted U relationship (Aghion et al 2005a). 
Second, there might be a U-shaped relation between competition and managerial slack 
(Schmidt 1997).  
 
We first estimate the effect that competition has had on all firms in our data. Next, to see if 
firms that were closer to the technological frontier have reacted differently to changes in the 
level of competition than those that were farther away, we define a measure of firm 
inefficiency, d, which is interacted with competition, and we estimate the following equation 
itittitititititititit indtimedcdcccdpi νααθθααθα ++++++++= −−−−−−− 43121311221211110  (6) 
The inefficiency level, d, is defined as the difference between the productivity of the most 
productive company in the industry in the current year and firm’s productivity, divided by the 
difference between the productivities of the most and the least productive firms. Thus d has 
values between 0 and 1, with the most efficient firm having d equal 0 and the least efficient 
one having d equal with 1. If competition stimulates frontier firms while hurting laggards, 
then θ1 and θ2 ought to have opposite signs to α1 and α2, respectively.  
 
To further investigate the differential impact of competition on firm productivity with respect 
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to the initial firm inefficiency we define laggards and frontier companies based on d, and we 
estimate (5) for each category. We consider companies with ds higher than 0.8 as laggards. 
Frontier firms, are defined as firms with ds lower than 0.2. 
 
In order to check the robustness of our results we estimate (5) using firm productivity based 
on OP but also based on OLS results. In addition, it is known that measurement errors bias the 
coefficients toward zero. Neither OP nor OLS take this bias into account. One way to deal 
with this bias is to introduce a constant return to scale restriction in the estimates. We believe 
that the coefficient of capital is mostly affected by measurement errors. We assume that OP 
provides an unbiased estimate of the labour coefficient and we calculate the capital coefficient 
by subtracting from 1 the labour coefficient. We name the productivity computed in this way 
CRS_OP productivity. 
 
3.2. Data description 
The empirical analysis is done on a panel data set of Czech firms for the period 1993-2005. 
Unlike other former communist countries from the Central Europe, economic reforms have 
started in Czech Republic only after the collapse of the communist regime in 1989. Since 
then, the Czech economy has undergone extensive transformations and reforms that have 
encouraged both domestic and foreign competition: liberalization of prices, exchange rates, 
trade and FDI flows, decentralization of wage setting, drastic cuts in public subsidies to 
enterprises, and adoption of legislation on competition, corporate governance, and intellectual 
property rights. The main economic reforms are summarized in Table 1. 
 
Firm level data is provided by Amadeus (see Appendix 1). We used data from all versions of 
the Amadeus database since 1996. The Amadeus database contains information on medium 
and large firms, including sector classification, balance sheets, profit and loss accounts, and 
the number of employees. We got an unbalanced panel of 5338 companies for the period 
1993-2005. The number of companies that we have for each year varies from 366 in the year 
1993 till 2954 in 2003. Figures A1.1, A1.2, A1.3 in Appendix 1 show that the average size 
(computed based on added value, capital, or employment) of the companies in our sample 
tends to decrease over time. The major changes occur in 1999 and 2000, the years 
immediately after the financial crisis that hit the Czech Republic in 1998. 
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Table 1. Main economic reforms 
Timing Reforms 
July 1990 Cancellation of the negative turnover tax in Czechoslovakia 
October 1990 –  
January 1991 
Cumulative devaluation of the koruna by around 75% against 
convertible currencies 
January 1991 A package of macroeconomic measures was launched. It included: 
? price liberalization (except for some sensitive prices such as 
electricity, gas, heating, rents, postage, public transport, etc.) 
? trade liberalization 
? wage regulation 
? drastic cuts in subsidies to enterprises 
? restrictive monetary and fiscal policies 
? sharp devaluation and the introduction of partial convertibility of 
the currency, koruna  
December 16, 1991 The Association Agreement with the EU was signed 
January 1, 1993 Dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic 
January 1993 Introduction of VAT. 
February 8, 1993 Separate Czech and Slovak currencies were introduced 
May 1993 The first wave of voucher privatisation 
May and July 1994 Liberalization of coal and gasoline prices 
March 1995 The second wave of voucher privatisation 
July 1995 Abolition of general wage regulation 
October 1995 Full current account convertibility of the Czech koruna 
January 1996 Official application for EU membership 
May 1, 2004 The country becomes a member of the EU 
January 2002 – 
December 2005 
Gradual liberalization of electricity prices 
March 2003 – … Liberalization of rents 
January 2005 – 
December 2006 
Gradual liberalization of gas prices 
 
 
To this data we added information on firm entry and exit provided by the Czech Statistical 
Office (CSO) and detailed industry level data, such as producer price indexes, the price index 
of capital inputs, industrial output, tariffs, and imports. Details of sources, definitions of 
variables, and the data cleaning process, and descriptive statistics can be found in Appendix 1. 
Here we describe only our competition measure, c.  
 
To capture effects arising from domestic competition we use, alternatively, two measure of 
market concentration at 4-digit ISIC level: Herfindal which is the Herfindal index and which 
is our main measure of domestic competition and Mkt concentration which is the 
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concentration ratio and is used for robustness checks.7 Both of them are computed based on 
the four largest firms in an industry. We use our own dataset to identify these companies. The 
sum of the squares of these firms’ sales for Herfindal, or just the simple sum for Mkt 
concentration were normalized using the sum of the industrial output and imports. Both 
Herfindal and Mkt concentration are inverse measures of competition. To capture the effect of 
foreign competition, we use Tariff rate, a weighted average (by trade value) of effectively 
applied rates, at 4-digit ISIC level. 
 
Due to the fact that we have data at the industry level only for the years 1995-2003, when 
estimating (5) and (6) we get an unbalanced panel of 7158 observations and 2249 companies 
for the period 1996-2004.  
 
Table 2. Herfindal index by industry 
Industry 1995 1999 2003
15 0.00469 0.00686 0.00791
17 0.02238 0.00725 0.00921
18  0.00251 0.00171
19 0.00735 0.00439 0.00268
20 0.02053 0.01972 0.00656
21 0.03847 0.01164 0.02047
24 0.01712 0.02520 0.01366
25 0.00103 0.00027 0.00086
26 0.01803 0.01524 0.00984
27 0.01006 0.00279 0.00145
28 0.00350 0.00248 0.00294
29 0.00258 0.01010 0.00258
30 0.00006 0.00112 0.00000
31 0.02259 0.01049 0.00980
32 0.00507 0.00196 0.00079
33 0.00275 0.00728 0.00375
34 0.00961 0.00664 0.00703
35 0.03625 0.00603 0.02437
36 0.00821 0.00983 0.00285
Industries: 15-Food products and beverages; 17-Textiles; 18-Wearing apparel; 19-Leather manufacturing; 20-
Wood and wood and cork products, except furniture; 21-Pulp, paper and paper products; 22-Publishing and 
printing; 24-Chemicals and chemical products; 25-Rubber and plastic products; 26-Non-metallic mineral 
products; 27-Basic metals; 28-Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment; 29-Machinery and 
equipment n.e.c.; 31-Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.; 32-Radio, television and communication 
equipment and apparatus; 33-Medical, precision and optical instruments; 34-Motor vehicles, trailers; 35-Other 
transport equipment; 36-Furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 
                                                 
7 To obtain firm level real output we deflate value added with industry price index. Therefore changes in our 
measure of real output could be driven by changes in productivity as well as by changes in the price index, and 
our measures of market concentration capture, besides the effect of competition of firm productivity the positive 
effect that an increase in the market concentration has on price markups (see Amiti and Konings 2007). 
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 In subsamples we have 725 (1096) observations in the low (high) productivity group and 158 
(211) companies.  
 
Data that we have on Tariff rate indicate that during the period we analyze, tariffs in Czech 
Republic have gradually decreased in almost all industries (see Figure A1.4). Also, our data 
indicates that from 1995 until 2003 there have been significant changes in the market 
structure (see Table 2). In most of the markets the competition has increased over the years. 
 
4. Results 
 
The OLS estimates of the production function (1) by industry at 2-digit NACE are reported in 
Table 3. To get the OP estimates of (1), we have estimated equations (2) and (3) for each 
industry separately, using polynomial expansions for h() and θ() (of third, respectively fifth 
degree). These results are also given in Table 3. According to our previous discussions, if OP 
corrects for the simultaneity bias induced by unobservable firm characteristics, we would 
expect coefficients of employment smaller than the ones we have with OLS. In 3 cases out of 
21, the estimated coefficients of employment do not decrease: industries 19 (manufacturing of 
leather), 21 (manufacturing of pulp and paper), and 35 (manufacturing of other transport 
equipment). The fact that the labour coefficient increases could reflect a negative correlation 
between the productivity shock and the use of labour in two of the industries. Overall these 
results indicate that the OP procedure corrects for the simultaneity bias. 
 
Turning to the effect of competition on firm productivity, our estimates of the equation (5) on 
all companies are given in Table 4, column (1). They show that Czech firms have benefited 
from trade liberalization, although at a decreasing rate. Evaluated at the sample mean (see 
Table A1.3 in Appendix), the marginal effect of an increase in tariff on firm productivity is 
negative – more import competition leads to higher productivity – and we stay with this effect 
even if we add two times the standard deviation (see Figure 1, (a)). Yet there are also few 
examples of the opposite effects as well, mostly in the food and beverages sectors (ISIC 1500) 
or for manufacturing of made-up textile articles (ISIC 1740) where the tariffs have been 
higher than in the rest of the industries. 
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Table 3.  OLS and Olley and Pakes estimates of production function 
 OLS Olley and Pakes 
Ind. Log Empl. 
Log 
Capital 
Returns 
to scale
No. 
Obs. R2 Log Empl.
Log 
Capital 
Returns 
to Scale
15 0.547*** 0.428*** 0.975 2837 0.75 0.501*** 0.510*** 1.011
17 0.639*** 0.290*** 0.929 832 0.83 0.562*** 0.230*** 0.792
18 0.705*** 0.203*** 0.908 267 0.87 0.687*** 0.261*** 0.948
19 0.693*** 0.196*** 0.889 156 0.79 0.729*** 0.204*** 0.933
20 0.617*** 0.355*** 0.972 654 0.79 0.564*** 0.207*** 0.771
21 0.446*** 0.486*** 0.932 315 0.81 0.448*** 0.201*** 0.649
22 0.546*** 0.282*** 0.828 525 0.73 0.518*** 0.158*** 0.676
24 0.523*** 0.420*** 0.943 786 0.84 0.457*** 0.377*** 0.834
25 0.538*** 0.379*** 0.917 1123 0.84 0.499*** 0.390*** 0.889
26 0.500*** 0.466*** 0.966 1294 0.81 0.487*** 0.292*** 0.779
27 0.617*** 0.327*** 0.944 630 0.85 0.551*** 0.442*** 0.993
28 0.582*** 0.307*** 0.889 2467 0.75 0.549*** 0.341*** 0.89
29 0.675*** 0.213*** 0.888 2557 0.79 0.617*** 0.237*** 0.854
31 0.677*** 0.266*** 0.943 1061 0.8 0.643*** 0.300*** 0.943
32 0.579*** 0.272*** 0.851 284 0.74 0.558*** 0.561*** 1.119
33 0.649*** 0.188*** 0.837 442 0.75 0.623*** 0.248*** 0.871
34 0.668*** 0.334*** 1.002 595 0.83 0.626*** 0.327*** 0.953
35 0.667*** 0.184*** 0.851 299 0.78 0.702*** 0.213*** 0.915
36 0.652*** 0.322*** 0.974 940 0.86 0.609*** 0.306*** 0.915
37 0.451*** 0.309*** 0.76 181 0.56 0.372*** 0.355*** 0.727
Industries: 15-Food products and beverages; 17-Textiles; 18-Wearing apparel; 19-Leather manufacturing; 20-
Wood and wood and cork products, except furniture; 21-Pulp, paper and paper products; 22-Publishing and 
printing; 24-Chemicals and chemical products; 25-Rubber and plastic products; 26-Non-metallic mineral 
products; 27-Basic metals; 28-Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment; 29-Machinery and 
equipment n.e.c.; 31-Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.; 32-Radio, television and communication 
equipment and apparatus; 33-Medical, precision and optical instruments; 34-Motor vehicles, trailers; 35-Other 
transport equipment; 36-Furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.; 37-Recycling 
 
 
Figure 1. The marginal effect of a change in competition on firm productivity 
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Regarding the impact of an increase in domestic competition, its effect has been negative in 
markets with already tough competition but has been positive in concentrated markets. This 
result is in line with theoretical results that point to an inverted U-shape relationship between 
competition and firm productivity. Given that at the level of industry aggregation that we have 
in our data, the markets are highly competitive (as indicated by the sample mean of 0.013 for 
the Herfindal index and by its 0.039 standard deviation), in most of the industries the impact 
of an increase in domestic competition on firm productivity has been positive (see Figure 1, 
(b)). There are, however, examples of the opposite effects as well, mostly among sub-
industries of textile manufacturing (ISIC 1700) and in the manufacture of aircraft and 
spacecraft (ISIC 3530).  
 
Estimates of equation (6) show that companies with different levels of efficiency respond 
differently to trade liberalization and to an increase in domestic competition, as all the 
interaction terms between competition and the level of firm inefficiency are highly significant 
(see Table 4, column (2)). Moreover, we can see from Table 4, column (2), that for highly 
inefficient firms (firms with a dit-1 closed to 1), both the first and the second order effects of a 
tariff reduction and of a decrease in competition on firm productivity decrease substantially. 
This indicates that the productivity of laggard companies does not to respond to changes in 
competition. However, frontier companies are affected by both, domestic and foreign 
competition (these effects should be close to the effects inferred from competition measures 
that are not interacted with distance as the highly efficient companies have a dit-1 closed to 0).  
 
The fact that changes in competition levels have different impacts for frontier than for laggard 
companies is further confirmed by our estimations of equation (5) on subsamples of efficient 
and inefficient companies (see Table 4, columns (3) and (4)). Thus, our results are in line with 
the predictions of the theoretical models developed by Boone (2000) and Aghion et al 
(2005b). Regarding the marginal effects of an increase in competition on firm productivity, 
for the highly productive firms, the positive relation between a decrease in tariff and firm 
productivity is less likely to hold now (Table 4, column (4)) than in the case when we 
estimate this effect using the entire sample (Table 4, column (1)). The opposite is true, 
however, for the positive impact of an increase in competition on firm productivity. 
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Table 4. The impact of competition on firm productivity8
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All firms All firms Low Prod High Prod 
lag Tariff rates -0.041*** -0.080*** -0.036 -0.076** 
 (3.80) (4.69) (1.16) (2.68) 
  square 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.001 0.003** 
 (3.43) (4.67) (1.09) (2.53) 
  * lagged inefficiency (dit-1)  0.062**   
  (2.02)   
  square * lagged inefficiency (dit-1)  -0.002**   
  (2.13)   
lag Herfindal 2.433** 5.457*** -0.250 5.161** 
 (2.04) (4.09) (0.15) (2.43) 
  square -6.720** -11.248*** -3.474 -9.697** 
 (2.42) (3.54) (0.80) (2.30) 
  * lagged inefficiency (dit-1)  -5.437***   
  (3.09)   
  square * lagged inefficiency (dit-1)  9.274***   
  (2.74)   
lagged inefficiency (dit-1)  -1.177***   
  (8.15)   
Constant 0.059 0.620*** -0.401** 0.571*** 
 (0.98) (6.40) (2.57) (4.31) 
Observations 7158 6988 725 1096 
R-squared 0.04 0.34 0.17 0.23 
 
t-statistic in parentheses; *** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level. 
Robust errors adjusted for clustering at 3-digit level in regressions (1) and (2) and to two digit level, due to smaller number of 
observations, in regressions (3) and (4). Year and industry dummies at 2 digit level. Base year: 1996 
 
          
We have further estimated the models (5) and (6) using only the level of tariff protection as a 
competition measure to see if in the absence of a control for domestic competition, the effect 
of trade liberalization on firm productivity is biased. The results are given in Table (5). When 
comparing these results with the ones in Table 4 we see that in the former estimates the 
impact of trade liberalization is underestimated (see results in columns (1) in both tables). 
Yet, the importance of the initial firm efficiency is seriously downplayed, the effects of the 
interaction terms between trade liberalization and the level of firm inefficiency being 
insignificant in Table 5, column (2), and having coefficients much closer to zero and lower 
                                                 
8 We got the same results when using industry dummies at 3 digit level in regressions (1)-(4), or when 
interacting industries dummies with the productivity distance in regressions (3) and (4). The results in 
regressions (5)-(8) do not change when we define low (high) productive companies as being the ones with a 
productivity distance less (higher) than 0.1 (0.9). We have experimented with dummies for exporting industries, 
for companies that exit the market, and with variables that differentiate between companies that produce goods 
within different industries at NACE 4-digit. Since none of these variables were significant, we have dropped 
them. We have also normalized the competition measures on industrial output rather than on the sum of 
industrial output and imports. The results are similar with the ones in the table above. 
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significance in regressions run on the subsample of highly productive firms (Table 5, column 
(4)). 
 
Table 5. The impact of trade liberalization on firm productivity (without domestic 
competition) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All All Low High 
lag Tariff rates -0.009** -0.016** 0.005 -0.019* 
 (2.28) (2.30) (0.65) (1.95) 
  square 0.000* 0.000*** -0.000 0.000** 
 (1.90) (2.65) (0.15) (2.36) 
  * lagged inefficiency (dit-1)  0.009   
  (1.07)   
  square * lagged inefficiency (dit-1)  -0.000   
  (1.25)   
lagged inefficiency (dit-1)  -0.943***   
  (14.45)   
Constant -0.038 0.394*** -0.569*** 0.399*** 
 (0.97) (7.27) (13.84) (7.24) 
Observations 12742 12338 1370 2029 
R-squared 0.03 0.29 0.12 0.14 
 
t-statistic in parentheses; *** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level. 
Robust errors adjusted for clustering at 3-digit level in regressions (1) and (2) and to two digit level, due to smaller number of 
observations, in regressions (3) and (4). Year and industry dummies at 2 digit level. Base year: 1996 
 
In general our results are robust to the two alternative measures of domestic competition we 
use, Herfindal and Mkt concentration, as the results in Appendix 2, Table 2.1 closely match 
the results in Table 4, the only difference being that although the square term of market 
concentration remains negative, it looses its significance. Also, the results in Appendix 2, 
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 show that using OLS and CRS_OP productivities we get the same results, 
with slightly less significance in the coefficients for the latter case. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have studied the impact of competition on firm performance in the Czech 
Republic. We have found that laggard and frontier firms respond differently to an increase in 
domestic competition and to trade liberalization. Firms that are close to the technological 
frontier benefit from trade liberalization. Also, they are affected by changes in domestic 
competition: an increase in competition has a positive impact on firm productivity in 
concentrated markets but has the opposite effect on firms with tough competition. We found 
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no effect of trade liberalization or competition on firm productivity in laggard companies. The 
results also indicate a non-linear effect from competition to productivity and are in line with 
the prediction of the theoretical models developed by Boone (2000) and Aghion et al (2005b). 
Furthermore, our results indicate that in the absence of a control for domestic competition, the 
impact of trade liberalization on firm productivity is understated. Meanwhile, in this case the 
role played by the initial firm efficiency in determining the effect of an increase in 
competition on firm productivity is seriously downplayed. 
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Appendix 1 – Data description 
 
Firm level data are from Amadeus. Amadeus is a pan-European commercial database, 
provided by Bureau van Dijk, which contains financial information on public and private 
companies. We used data from all versions of the Amadeus database since 1996 with 
information on medium and large firms. Most of the Czech firms included in the database 
produce goods in several industries at 4 digit NACE level. We have classified firms according 
to their main activity.  
 
We did the following modifications to the data:  
i. we excluded all companies that had less than 10 employees: 
ii. we excluded firms with non-positive investment levels when estimating firm productivity 
iii. since we did not have enough observations in three industries at 2-digit NACE level (16 – 
manufacture of tobacco, 23 – manufacture of coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel, 30 – 
manufacture of office machinery and computers) to estimate the production function we 
dropped companies from this sector. 
iv. we dropped 2 observations to exclude firms with market shares higher than 100. 
v. we dropped 6 observations to exclude firms with a productivity index less than -5 as they 
looked to be outliers (see Figure A1.4). 
 
Table A1.1. Variables 
Variable Definition 
y (log of output) Added value deflated by the producer price index (PPI). For most of the 
industries, we have the PPI at 3-digit NACE; for the remaining we have 
used PPI at 2-digit NACE.9
Sources: Added value is from Amadeus and Aspekt; PPI from the Czech Statistical 
Office. 
Coverage: 1993-2005 
k (capital) Tangible fixed assets deflated by the price index for gross fixed capital 
formation, at a slightly more aggregated level than 2-digit NACE. 
Sources: Tangible fixed assets are from Amadeus and Aspekt; price index for gross 
fixed capital formation from AMECO. 
Coverage: 1993-2005 
l (log of labour) Number of employees. 
Sources: Amadeus and Aspekt 
Coverage: 1994-2005 
i (investment) Computed as ititit kki )1(1 δ−−= + , where δ = 15%. 
Coverage: 1993-2004 
Tariff rate Weighted average (by trade value) of effectively applied rates, taking 
into consideration applicable (and available) preferential duties. 
Source: WTO 
Coverage: 1994-2004 
Herfindal Number of companies in a 4-digit ISIC industry 
Sources: UNIDO via Campus Solutions. 
Coverage: 1995-2003 
                                                 
9Mairesse and Jaumandreu (2005) show that deflating value added with PPI rather than a firm specific price 
index leads to very similar estimates of the coefficients in the production function. 
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Mkt concentration The ratio of the sales of the 4 companies with the biggest sales and the 
industrial output, at 4-digit ISIC level. 
Sources: Firm sales are from Amadeus and Aspekt; industrial output is from UNIDO 
via Campus Solutions. 
Coverage: 1995-2003 
Inefficiency (dit) = (Max(productivity)-productivity) / (Max(productivity)-
Min(productivity) at 4-digit NACE level 
 
Table A1.2. Descriptive statistics – observations based on which firm productivity is 
estimated 
Variable   Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
y overall 6.197 1.335 0.118 12.359 N =   19940 
  between   1.312 0.442 11.880 n =    5338 
  within   0.389 0.342 9.088 T-bar = 3.73548 
k overall 6.265 1.770 0.041 12.991 N =   19940 
  between   1.881 0.041 12.665 n =    5338 
  within   0.351 1.402 10.161 T-bar = 3.73548 
l overall 5.224 1.153 2.303 10.129 N =   19940 
  between   1.180 2.303 10.005 n =    5338 
  within   0.233 2.445 7.413 T-bar = 3.73548 
i overall 0.505 2.826 0.000004 125.106 N =   19940 
  between   1.594 0.000 74.944 n =    5338 
  within   1.386 -45.009 87.663 T-bar = 3.73548 
OP productivity overall 1.190 0.873 -5.069 5.283 N =   19940 
  between   0.816 -3.217 4.949 n =    5338 
  within   0.367 -4.478 3.982 T-bar = 3.73548 
 
Table A1.3a. Descriptive statistics – observations based on which the impact of competition 
on firm productivity is estimated 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
lav_real overall 6.354 1.249 0.118 11.748 N =    7158 
 between  1.277 0.118 11.343 n =    2249 
 within  0.296 1.495 8.458 T-bar = 3.18275 
k overall 6.483 1.550 0.445 12.192 N =    7158 
 between  1.668 0.445 12.109 n =    2249 
 within  0.254 3.740 8.187 T-bar = 3.18275 
l overall 5.347 1.063 2.303 9.842 N =    7158 
 between  1.114 2.303 9.842 n =    2249 
 within  0.209 3.384 6.822 T-bar = 3.18275 
i overall 0.421 1.725 0.000 60.730 N =    7158 
 between  1.289 0.000 35.192 n =    2249 
 within  0.957 -22.484 31.855 T-bar = 3.18275 
OP productivity overall 1.163 0.791 -4.211 5.283 N =    7158 
 between  0.745 -4.211 5.070 n =    2249 
 within  0.284 -3.283 3.190 T-bar = 3.18275 
Tariff rate overall 6.702 4.657 0.000 27.530 N =    7158 
 between  4.403 0.005 27.530 n =    2249 
 within  1.028 -7.674 27.036 T-bar = 3.18275 
Herfindal overall 0.010 0.027 0.000 0.626 N =    7158 
 between  0.022 0.000 0.360 n =    2249 
 within  0.017 -0.308 0.564 T-bar = 3.18275 
Mkt concentration overall 0.126 0.107 0.001 1.006 N =    7158 
 between  0.099 0.001 0.952 n =    2249 
 within  0.053 -0.336 0.909 T-bar = 3.18275 
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Table A1.3b. Descriptive statistics – low productivity firms in 1995 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
lav_real overall 6.245 1.091 2.010 9.303 N =     725 
 between  1.091 3.527 9.060 n =     158 
 within  0.408 1.385 8.036 T-bar = 4.58861 
k overall 6.747 1.163 2.670 10.933 N =     725 
 between  1.246 3.947 10.933 n =     158 
 within  0.253 5.167 8.327 T-bar = 4.58861 
l overall 5.460 0.959 2.996 9.842 N =     725 
 between  0.993 2.996 9.842 n =     158 
 within  0.207 4.401 6.309 T-bar = 4.58861 
i overall 0.312 0.578 0.000 5.558 N =     725 
 between  0.701 0.004 5.558 n =     158 
 within  0.307 -1.128 3.153 T-bar = 4.58861 
OP productivity overall 0.916 0.774 -2.971 2.976 N =     725 
 between  0.707 -1.525 2.761 n =     158 
 within  0.378 -3.529 2.458 T-bar = 4.58861 
Tariff rate overall 6.162 3.821 0.010 27.530 N =     725 
 between  3.231 0.010 21.035 n =     158 
 within  1.052 1.272 13.432 T-bar = 4.58861 
Herfindal overall 0.013 0.039 0.000 0.416 N =     725 
 between  0.036 0.000 0.302 n =     158 
 within  0.023 -0.168 0.245 T-bar = 4.58861 
Mkt concentration overall 0.123 0.124 0.003 1.006 N =     725 
 between  0.125 0.008 0.833 n =     158 
 within  0.066 -0.327 0.648 T-bar = 4.58861 
 
Table A1.3c. Descriptive statistics – high productivity firms in 1995 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
lav_real overall 7.110 1.250 4.041 11.748 N =    1096 
 between  1.247 4.370 11.343 n =     211 
 within  0.257 5.760 8.231 T-bar = 5.19431 
k overall 7.130 1.593 1.977 12.192 N =    1096 
 between  1.646 2.785 12.109 n =     211 
 within  0.266 5.428 8.478 T-bar = 5.19431 
l overall 5.869 1.065 2.996 9.782 N =    1096 
 between  1.094 2.996 9.615 n =     211 
 within  0.224 4.977 6.631 T-bar = 5.19431 
i overall 0.807 2.946 0.000 60.730 N =    1096 
 between  2.749 0.002 35.192 n =     211 
 within  1.613 -22.098 26.345 T-bar = 5.19431 
OP productivity overall 1.458 0.830 -0.977 4.274 N =    1096 
 between  0.757 -0.283 3.840 n =     211 
 within  0.260 0.150 2.464 T-bar = 5.19431 
Tariff rate overall 7.261 4.719 0.000 27.530 N =    1096 
 between  4.130 0.005 21.635 n =     211 
 within  1.281 1.366 21.329 T-bar = 5.19431 
Herfindal overall 0.014 0.036 0.000 0.626 N =    1096 
 between  0.022 0.000 0.164 n =     211 
 within  0.029 -0.106 0.567 T-bar = 5.19431 
Mkt concentration overall 0.144 0.130 0.005 1.006 N =    1096 
 between  0.108 0.007 0.633 n =     211 
 within  0.073 -0.132 0.926 T-bar = 5.19431 
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Figure A1.1: Log of value added by industry 1993 – 2005.   
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Graphs by ind_2digit
Industries: 15-Food products and beverages; 16-Tobacco products; 17-Textiles; 18-Wearing apparel; 19-Leather 
manufacturing; 20-Wood and wood and cork products, except furniture; 21-Pulp, paper and paper products; 22-
Publishing and printing; 23-Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel; 24-Chemicals and chemical 
products; 25-Rubber and plastic products; 26-Non-metallic mineral products; 27-Basic metals; 28-Fabricated 
metal products, except machinery and equipment; 29-Machinery and equipment n.e.c.; 30-Office machinery and 
computers; 31-Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.; 32-Radio, television and communication equipment 
and apparatus; 33-Medical, precision and optical instruments; 34-Motor vehicles, trailers; 35-Other transport 
equipment; 36-Furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.; 37-Recycling 
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Figure A1.2: Log of capital by industries 1993 - 2005.  
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Industries: 15-Food products and beverages; 16-Tobacco products; 17-Textiles; 18-Wearing apparel; 19-Leather 
manufacturing; 20-Wood and wood and cork products, except furniture; 21-Pulp, paper and paper products; 22-
Publishing and printing; 23-Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel; 24-Chemicals and chemical 
products; 25-Rubber and plastic products; 26-Non-metallic mineral products; 27-Basic metals; 28-Fabricated 
metal products, except machinery and equipment; 29-Machinery and equipment n.e.c.; 30-Office machinery and 
computers; 31-Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.; 32-Radio, television and communication equipment 
and apparatus; 33-Medical, precision and optical instruments; 34-Motor vehicles, trailers; 35-Other transport 
equipment; 36-Furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.; 37-Recycling 
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Figure A1.3: Log of employment by industry 1993 – 2005. 
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Figure A1.4. Tariff protection by industry (due to much higher tariffs, industry 15 has a 
different scale than the other industries and is therefore depicted in a separate graph). 
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Appendix 2 – Robustness checks 
Tabel A2.1. The impact of competition of firm productivity if market concentration rather 
than the Herfindal index is used to measure domestic competition  
 (2) (4) (6) (8) 
 All firms All firms Low Prod High Prod 
lag Tariff rates -0.039*** -0.072*** -0.038 -0.068** 
 (3.55) (4.31) (1.17) (2.55) 
  square 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.001 0.002** 
 (3.28) (4.24) (1.10) (2.42) 
  * lagged inefficiency (dit-1)  0.051*   
  (1.72)   
  square * lagged inefficiency (dit-1)  -0.002*   
  (1.71)   
lag Mkt concentration 0.915*** 1.795*** 0.392 1.539** 
 (3.37) (5.14) (0.95) (2.43) 
  square -0.965 -1.683*** -0.944* -1.099 
 (1.54) (3.19) (1.94) (1.43) 
  * lagged inefficiency (dit-1)  -1.959***   
  (3.74)   
  square * lagged inefficiency (dit-1)  1.912**   
  (2.15)   
lagged inefficiency (dit-1)  -1.001***   
  (6.72)   
Constant -0.029 0.451*** -0.424** 0.406** 
 (0.42) (4.11) (2.53) (2.87) 
Observations 7158 6988 725 1096 
R-squared 0.05 0.34 0.17 0.24 
 
t-statistic in parentheses; *** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level. 
Robust errors adjusted for clustering at 3-digit level in regressions (1) and (2) and to two digit level, due to smaller number of 
observations, in regressions (3) and (4). Year and industry dummies at 2 digit level. Base year: 1996 
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Tabel A2.2. The impact of competition of firm productivity using OLS Productivity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 All firms All firms All firms All firms Low Prod Low Prod High Prod High Prod 
lag Tariff rates -0.028*** -0.027*** -0.071*** -0.066*** -0.019 -0.020 -0.069*** -0.062*** 
 (3.33) (3.11) (5.41) (5.11) (0.90) (0.87) (3.61) (3.61) 
   square 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.001 0.001 0.003*** 0.002*** 
 (2.87) (2.68) (5.64) (5.18) (0.77) (0.76) (3.38) (3.36) 
   * lagged inefficiency    0.075*** 0.066***     
     (dit-1)   (3.20) (2.91)     
  square *lagged    -0.003*** -0.003***     
  inefficiency (dit-1)   (3.63) (3.18)     
lag Herfindal 1.756**  3.529***  -0.169  3.163**  
 (2.15)  (3.20)  (0.11)  (2.29)  
   square -5.415**  -8.523***  -3.135  -5.969**  
 (2.60)  (3.22)  (0.75)  (2.24)  
   * lagged inefficiency    -3.755**      
      (dit-1)   (2.27)      
  square *lagged    7.604**      
 inefficiency (dit-1)   (2.20)      
lag Mkt concentration  0.739***  1.399***  0.196  1.127** 
  (3.44)  (4.34)  (0.58)  (2.46) 
   square  -0.916*  -1.563***  -0.641  -0.827 
  (1.92)  (2.97)  (1.51)  (1.31) 
   * lagged inefficiency     -1.515***     
      (dit-1)    (2.85)     
  square *lagged     1.638**     
  inefficiency (dit-1)    (2.09)     
lagged inefficiency   -1.143*** -1.006***     
(dit-1)   (9.72) (8.00)     
Constant 0.005 -0.062 0.546*** 0.417*** -0.434*** -0.439*** 0.499*** 0.369*** 
 (0.10) (1.03) (6.64) (4.35) (3.28) (3.02) (5.00) (3.22) 
Observations 7156 7156 6985 6985 706 706 1168 1168 
R-squared 0.03 0.04 0.31 0.31 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.19 
 
t-statistic in parentheses; *** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level. 
Robust errors adjusted for clustering at 3-digit level in regressions (1)-(4) and to two digit level, due to smaller number of 
observations, in regressions (5)-(8). Year and industry dummies at 2 digit level. Base year: 1996 
 
 29
Table A2.3. The impact of competition of firm productivity using CRS_OP productivity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 All firms All firms All firms All firms Low Prod Low Prod High Prod High Prod 
lag Tariff rates -0.016* -0.015* -0.053*** -0.049*** -0.018 -0.019 -0.059*** -0.057*** 
 (1.87) (1.77) (3.29) (3.11) (0.88) (0.89) (4.75) (4.26) 
   square 0.001* 0.000 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001 0.001 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (1.70) (1.60) (3.54) (3.26) (0.75) (0.77) (4.74) (4.30) 
   * lagged inefficiency    0.062** 0.056**     
     (dit-1)   (2.37) (2.18)     
  square *lagged    -0.002*** -0.002**     
  inefficiency (dit-1)   (2.70) (2.43)     
lag Herfindal 1.123  2.220**  -0.422  4.293  
 (1.56)  (2.28)  (0.31)  (1.66)  
   square -4.408**  -6.951**  -0.892  -20.721  
 (2.20)  (2.39)  (0.25)  (1.66)  
   * lagged inefficiency    -2.773*      
      (dit-1)   (1.74)      
  square *lagged    6.475      
 inefficiency (dit-1)   (1.58)      
lag Mkt concentration  0.508**  1.033***  -0.201  0.477 
  (2.34)  (2.96)  (0.61)  (0.83) 
   square  -0.756  -1.299**  0.066  -0.080 
  (1.66)  (2.18)  (0.14)  (0.09) 
   * lagged inefficiency     -1.188**     
      (dit-1)    (1.99)     
  square *lagged     1.291     
  inefficiency (dit-1)    (1.21)     
lagged inefficiency   -1.119*** -1.010***     
(dit-1)   (8.03) (6.76)     
Constant -0.090* -0.132** 0.449*** 0.355*** -0.497*** -0.474*** 0.454*** 0.410*** 
 (1.68) (2.11) (4.43) (3.11) (3.61) (3.20) (5.89) (3.83) 
Observations 7156 7156 6985 6985 669 669 1052 1052 
R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.31 0.31 0.18 0.18 0.15 0.15 
 
t-statistic in parentheses; *** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level. 
Robust errors adjusted for clustering at 3-digit level in regressions (1)-(4) and to two digit level, due to smaller number of 
observations, in regressions (5)-(8). Year and industry dummies at 2 digit level. Base year: 1996 
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